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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines strategy development processes in surface transportation systems. In the 
U.S., transportation organizations typically develop strategy through a formal planning process; 
however, planning is not the only approach for developing strategy. Other approaches include, 
for example, negotiation, visioning, learning, and consensus-building. Regardless of the 
particular approach or combination of approaches, strategy development processes have several 
elements in common. We identify four such elements of particular importance in surface 
transportation – revenue sources, information sources, temporal scales, and spatial scales – and 
analyze the impact that advancements in transportation technology have had on each element. 
While new technologies (e.g. Intelligent Transportation Systems, or ITS) have been applied 
extensively to improve transportation operations, they have not been used to enable innovative 
strategy development processes. By understanding more fully the relationships between strategy 
and technology, organizations may consider adoption of innovative strategy development 
processes, such as improvements to the planning process or alternatives to planning altogether.
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INTRODUCTION 
Technological advancement often brings not just new concepts and products but 
opportunities to change the foundations of an organization or entire sector. Surface 
transportation is no exception. The past several decades brought continual advances in 
the underlying technologies of surface transportation. Deployment of sensors, guidance 
systems, and other features for vehicles and infrastructure enabled important 
improvements to the operations and management of highway and transit systems. 
Researchers and practitioners continue to develop and deploy advanced-technology 
concepts, products, and services, many of them under the banner of Intelligent 
Transportation Systems (ITS). 
Despite technological gains, many of the organizations responsible for surface 
transportation have not yet realized the full, strategic value of advanced transportation 
technologies. For example, data collected from advanced technology systems often go 
unused beyond operations, and many transportation agencies’ strategy development 
processes remain unchanged. A recent Los Angeles Times article discusses that city’s 
failure to save traffic data from an extensive signal control network for more than “a few 
days” (1). 
The potential exists to improve the performance of surface transportation systems 
by fundamentally changing underlying strategy development processes, such as planning, 
which is currently the predominant approach to strategy development in the U.S. 
Advanced technologies, as they have in the past, can play an important enabling role. 
This paper introduces the notion of strategy development for surface transportation and 
explains the relationships between technology and some key elements of strategy 
development processes. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Strategy is an existential feature and strategy development an existential activity of any 
organization. Nonetheless, management literature covering the topic of strategy is often 
conflicting: researchers disagree on such fundamental questions as how to define 
strategy, how (and whether) to develop strategy, and how to relate strategy to operations. 
In this section, we present several schools of thought in the field of strategy and describe 
contemporary strategy development in surface transportation. 
 
Strategy 
Management literature provides numerous definitions of strategy. One of the earliest and 
perhaps most complete was offered by Harvard Business School’s Kenneth Andrews, 
who defined corporate strategy as: 
  
The pattern of decisions in a company that determines and reveals its objectives, 
purposes, or goals, produces the principal policies and plans for achieving those 
goals, and defines the range of business the company is to pursue, the kind of 
economic and human organization it is or intends to be, and the nature of the 
economic and non-economic contribution it intends to make to its shareholders, 
employees, customers, and communities (2). 
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Other academics have offered more succinct definitions. Alfred Chandler, for instance, 
defines strategy as “the determination of the basic long-term goals and objectives of an 
enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary 
for carrying out these goals” (2). Henderson defines strategy in terms of competitiveness 
as “a deliberate search for a plan of action that will develop a business’s competitive 
advantage and compound it” (3). Similarly, Porter, one of the most recognized scholars in 
the field of competitive strategy, frames the development of strategy as an explicit 
response to (or anticipation of) competition, based on empirical study of firms and 
industries using analytical techniques from industrial economics (4). All of these 
definitions interpret strategy as an object which can be created or pursued, perhaps 
rationally, but in all cases deliberately. 
Some strategy thinkers, notably Henry Mintzberg, make an important distinction 
between deliberate and emergent strategies. Deliberate strategies are consciously 
developed, formulated, devised, or otherwise crafted by planners, strategists, and decision 
makers, typically through a rational process such as planning. An emergent strategy, on 
the other hand, is one that an organization exhibits through its pattern of strategic 
decisions and behavior over time, necessarily without planning or otherwise deliberately 
crafting a strategy. Deliberate strategies are developed by organizations to guide future 
behavior; emergent strategies, on the other hand, are unanticipated and can only be 
recognized in retrospect. Although elements of a deliberate strategy can appear in an 
emergent strategy, Mintzberg et al. refer to an empirical study showing that emergent 
strategies differ from deliberate (e.g., planned) strategies within the same organization as 
much as 90% of the time (5). Nonetheless, deliberate strategy has historically been more 
prevalent in the literature, as it offers specific, actionable approaches to managers for 
developing strategy. 
More nuanced views of strategy exist as well, as summarized in Mintzberg et al. 
(5). The authors present ten “schools” of strategy, each of which characterizes the way in 
which strategy comes to exist within an organization. In addition to the deliberate schools 
of planning, design, positioning, visioning, and cognition, the authors describe strategy 
development by negotiation, as a reaction to external conditions, as a collective process, 
through learning, and as a process of transformation. Political science researchers have 
characterized strategy as emergent from a process of negotiation. Others conceive of 
strategy as a reaction to an environment over which an organization has little or no 
control and, therefore, no real strategic “choices.” Although this fatalistic perspective has 
been criticized as not reflective of the true choices available to managers and other actors 
in most organizations, “strategy as reaction” accurately describes the strategy 
development process of organizations such as government agencies that are subject to 
control by higher-level organizations. Still others conceive of strategy development as a 
learning process, whereby the disparate pieces of an organization “self-organize” and a 
strategy emerges as patterns recognizable in the decisions of many decentralized 
individual or business units. 
None of these categorized descriptions of strategy is mutually exclusive. 
Moreover, there is no consensus within the strategy field as to the single best approach 
for developing strategy. Yet, the categories offered by Mintzberg et al. are often accurate 
in describing the existing strategy development processes within particular contexts. In 
the next two sections, we argue that the strategy development process for surface 
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transportation in the U.S. has evolved over the past several decades from largely 
visioning and negotiation to planning. 
 
Strategy Development in Surface Transportation 
Until the latter half of the 20th century, strategy development for surface transportation 
infrastructure was largely the domain of elected leaders who determined strategy through 
a combination of political visioning and negotiation. Planning, on the other hand, was 
seen as a technical activity to support the execution of those politically-determined 
strategies. Perhaps this explains why Banister laments the lack of “clear theoretical 
foundations” for transportation planning in the mid-20th century (6). Instead, 
transportation planning was, in its early stages, a strictly technical activity facilitating the 
largely political objective to complete a national road network. The foundations of 
planning were in civil engineering; planners used engineering principles to analyze and 
select the lowest-cost routes for highway facilities. 
As vehicle and infrastructure technology improved and transportation networks 
grew more complex in the latter half of the 20th century, planning processes were 
continuously refined. At first, residents objected to the highway-focused approach of a 
civil engineering-dominated urban planning field in the late 1950s and 1960s. This led to 
the “opening” of the planning process from a strictly technical, engineering activity to 
one that incorporated the perspectives of other interest groups (7). Wildavsky reflects the 
opening of planning during that era by defining the term planning as future control, 
cause, power, adaptation, process, intention, rationality, and faith, each of which 
transcends a purely technical perspective (8). Elected officials still largely determined 
strategy and made strategic decisions, although planning provided increasing input to the 
political process of negotiation. 
The 1970s and 1980s saw the planning process expand further to include, for 
example, community and environmental interests, trends which were eventually codified 
into the continuing, comprehensive transportation planning process, many of whose 
elements remain in place today (9). Throughout this transformative era, transportation 
planning has been characterized as a formal, “rational” process (e.g., 7, 10, 11), reflective 
perhaps of its roots in engineering. 
As the scope of planning activities has expanded, the influence of transportation 
planners over strategy development processes has likewise grown, such that today the 
control over strategy development rests largely not within the political arena, but within 
the professional, bureaucratic arena. The planning process produces strategies based on 
rational technical analysis and stakeholder considerations. Whereas, in the past, the 
strategic decisions of elected officials were supported by the planning process, today the 
strategies are actually produced through the planning process, and those strategies in turn 
guide the strategic decisions of executive organizations and elected decision-makers. 
 
Institutional Context of Transportation Strategy Development 
The dominance of the planning process as a means of developing strategy for 
transportation is often tempered by the institutional contexts within which planning 
occurs. In this section we describe the institutional contexts within which strategy is 
developed for surface transportation in the U.S. 
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Hooghe and Marks make a distinction in the political science literature between 
functionally-defined and geographically-defined units of government (12). 
Geographically-defined governments provide a diversity of public services in non-
overlapping, spatially-defined jurisdictions. Several layers can exist, as in the federalist 
structure of U.S. and state governments. By contrast, functionally-defined governments 
provide specific services or functions. In the transportation context, port and airport 
authorities, mass transit agencies, turnpike authorities, and special highway districts are 
examples of functionally-specific government agencies with relative functional autonomy 
but substantial spatial overlap. Strategy development in surface transportation is an 
activity of both geographic and functional government agencies. For example, the 
transportation planning and investment decision-making activities of cities, MPOs, and 
states in the U.S. constitute geographically-based strategy development. On the other 
hand, strategy development activities can also be performed by the more functionally-
defined transit agencies, port authorities, and turnpike authorities. 
In the U.S. context, the legal powers, political strength, and financial resources of 
various functional transportation agencies, local governments, regional governments 
(e.g., MPOs), and state governments are significant factors shaping the strategy 
development process. For example, Goldman argues that local governments in some 
areas of California have become de facto transportation planning authorities as they use 
their power to conduct ballot initiatives to raise taxes for particular transportation projects 
as a means of bypassing “the formal metropolitan planning process” (13). Perhaps better 
stated, ballot initiatives have bypassed planning altogether as a preferred local strategy 
development process. At the state level, variations in legislation and control over the 
finances and activities of local and regional governments have significant impact. For 
example, the Michigan legislature requires that 90% of all state transportation funding be 
dedicated to maintenance and preservation. By contrast, North Carolina’s state 
constitution requires a state network of highways such that “90% of… residents have 
access to a four-lane, divided highway within five miles of their homes,” resulting in an 
emphasis on capacity expansion in that state (14). Despite having largely similar 
superficial organizational architectures (such as MPOs), regions and states across the 
U.S. vary significantly in the details of their strategy development processes and in the 
actual strategies and strategic decisions they pursue. 
The large number of organizations, often overlapping, that participate in strategy 
development can appear cumbersome. For example, Chisholm chronicled the condition 
of mass transit in the San Francisco Bay Area in the 1970s and 1980s, which consisted of 
numerous agencies making strategic decisions more or less autonomously (15). 
Nonetheless, according to Chisholm, the considerable network of informal personal 
linkages among the managers of the systems resulted in the successful performance of 
this institutional structure. More recently, Macario evaluated mobility strategies for urban 
areas around the world, including the U.S. Observations and survey results support the 
conclusion that strategies and strategic decisions are fragmented by the organizational 
and jurisdictional complexity of many large urban areas. This fragmentation prevented 
any urban areas in the study from developing an integrated, coherent, forward-looking 
transportation strategy (16). However, the absence of a forward-looking strategy study 
does not preclude the existence of an emergent strategy. In fact, “emergent” strategies 
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exist (in retrospect) in spite of the absence of a deliberate or coherent effort to develop a 
forward-looking strategy. 
 
Summary 
We contend that transportation planning is but one of many potential processes of 
strategy development for organizations and for regions, although admittedly the dominant 
strategy development process in the U.S. In turn, strategic decisions (e.g., allocating 
resources, setting standards, and promulgating regulations) are guided by those strategies. 
Although in many cases strategic decisions are ultimately subject to the approval of 
elected and appointed leaders (and sometimes, the electorate directly), the 
implementation of planning processes in the U.S. has largely removed development of 
strategy from the political arena and placed it in the hands of planners. 
Given that the power over transportation strategy now rests in the hands of 
organizations and agencies rather than elected or appointed leaders, it is important to 
exercise that power effectively. The next section discusses four important elements 
(revenue sources, data sources, temporal scales, and spatial scales) of strategy 
development processes. By considering technology-enabled changes to these elements, 
organizations can begin to consider improving their strategy development processes, 
whether by working within the existing planning processes or by adopting alternatives to 
planning altogether. 
 
ELEMENTS OF STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES 
In this section we explore the relationships between transportation technology and 
specific elements of strategy development processes, including: revenue sources, data 
sources, temporal scales, and spatial scales. These elements vary considerably from place 
to place and organization to organization. We discuss the general role of each element in 
strategy development processes, and we emphasize the role that technology has played in 
shaping the current way that each element is used for strategy development. 
 
Revenue Sources 
The choice of revenue sources that fund transportation investments is a function of 
political and institutional factors in an organization or region, and also of the technology 
available to support revenue collection. As such, revenue sources evolve as political 
factors and technologies change. Once selected, however, revenue sources play an 
important role as part of the strategy development process for surface transportation. 
The “user pay” principle has been favored in the U.S. beginning with toll-
financed private turnpikes of the 1800s until today, where the majority of transportation 
revenues is derived from dedicated user fees (i.e., fees collected are re-invested in the 
transportation system), including fuel taxes, vehicle licensing fees, vehicle ownership 
taxes, and driver registration fees. State governments collect the majority of user fees 
directly; in addition, with some exceptions, federal user fee revenues are returned to the 
state governments. Most transit agencies derive some revenues from fares, but the 
majority of funding comes from a combination of non-user fees (e.g., local sales or 
property taxes and federal grants for capital expenditures) (17). 
State DOTs collect revenues, develop strategies, and disburse revenues. MPOs, on 
the other hand, use a formal planning process to develop strategies for metropolitan 
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regions that then guide the investments of all transportation agencies in a region, 
including transit authorities, state departments of transportation, port authorities, turnpike 
authorities, and others; however, they neither collect nor disburse revenues. MPO plans 
must be “financially constrained,” meaning that planners must demonstrate the revenue 
sources for the projects and investments contained in the plan (9). By contrast, many 
European countries fund surface transportation through general tax revenues (e.g., 
income, property, fuel, and value-added taxes).  
Technology is a major factor in shaping the choice of revenue sources. Although 
the “user pay” principle has historically been practiced in the U.S., the relatively slow 
advancement of revenue collection technology (compared to the pace of growth in 
vehicle and infrastructure technology) has been a factor in the continuing reliance on fuel 
taxes. As a result of this practice, strategy development processes depend on aggregated 
sources of funding, for instance at the state level, since states are both strong units of 
government and efficient geographic scales for collecting fuel taxes. The result is that 
states must make strategic investment decisions without much resolution on the source of 
revenues, relying instead on a combination of rational analysis, historical resource 
allocation formulas, and political resource bargaining to guide investment decisions. The 
same is true for European countries whose strategy development processes rely on 
revenues provided through general revenues, typically at the level of the national 
government. 
An exception to the general trend of using fuel and other taxes for transportation 
is The Netherlands, which is in the process of transforming its highway transportation 
funding scheme. The objective of the transformation is to replace the existing 
combination of fuel taxes, registration fees, vehicle ownership taxes, and other revenue 
mechanisms with a nationally-scaled “pay by the kilometer” revenue scheme (18). The 
Netherlands’ scheme is enabled by electronic toll collection (ETC) – more specifically, a 
system which combines vehicle tracking (e.g., global navigation satellite systems, or 
GNSS) and communications (e.g., dedicated short-range communications, or DSRC) 
technologies. As the technological capabilities improve and costs decrease, ETC may 
allow for a more comprehensive replacement of fuel taxes and other assorted fees with 
direct, real-time user charges based on time of day, location, type of vehicle, and other 
factors. 
While technology-enabled road pricing schemes such as that in The Netherlands 
are typically discussed in the context of addressing congestion, they also provide 
opportunities for reconsidering the role that revenues play in the strategy development 
process. In general, property taxes, income taxes, and other general sources of revenue 
for transportation do not generate data of value for transportation strategists. Even the 
fuel tax provides only aggregate information about revenues, which can be used to 
compute total travel consumption, perhaps with some geographic disaggregation, 
depending on the precise method of collection. With ETC, however, the data collected 
from travelers can provide much greater detail, including locations and distances traveled 
and amount of charges paid (19). This information could be used to improve strategy 
development, either within the existing planning processes or through a new, “user-
driven” approach to strategy development. 
Table 1 summarizes some of the factors related to revenue sources, including a 
relative measure of the level of technological sophistication required to support each type 
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of revenue source and the types of data generated that may be relevant to strategic 
managers of transportation systems. 
 
TABLE 1  Transportation Revenue Sources 
Revenue source Relative technology investment required 
Data generated with relevance to 
transportation 
General taxes (income, 
sales, VAT, etc.) 
Low Demographic 
Property tax Low Land-use and land-value data 
Fuel tax Low Aggregate revenues and fuel 
consumption 
Vehicle/driver 
registration fees 
Low Vehicles and driver demographics 
Manual tolling Low Facility-specific revenues, 
aggregated 
Electronic tolling Medium Facility-specific revenues, 
disaggregated at the vehicle/driver 
level 
VMT/VKT-based 
tolling 
Advanced Travel data highly disaggregated 
at the vehicle/driver level 
Transit tokens/cash Low Facility-specific revenues, 
aggregated 
Transit smartcards, tap-
in 
Medium Partial travel data  
Transit smartcards, tap-
in/tap-out 
Medium Travel data disaggregated at the 
user level  
 
ETC promises to provide a more direct method of revenue collection which can 
improve the ability of strategists to understand exactly where and when revenues were 
derived. Such information can enable major changes to the strategy development process. 
Ultimately, such changes must occur within political and institutional frameworks that 
are not necessarily accommodative of change. Nonetheless, the potential exists to use 
new sources of revenues enabled by advanced technology (and the information those 
revenues represent) to re-think strategic decisions as well as the processes and institutions 
in which strategic decisions are made.  
 
Data Sources 
Like revenue sources, data play a major role in strategy development processes (in many 
ways, revenues are data). There are, of course, a variety of sources and types of data that 
organizations use in their strategy development processes and in making strategic 
decisions. However, data look differently and are used differently from place to place and 
organization to organization. As with revenue sources, technology determines what data 
are available, while political factors determine how those data may or may not be used. 
Surface transportation organizations typically rely on a wide variety of 
information for strategy development. For example, MPOs produce regional travel 
models as part of their planning processes, which require substantial input of regional 
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travel data such as the physical transportation network, land uses, and demographics 
(e.g., population, density, income, age, employment). Models are validated using origin-
destination surveys and traffic counts on all modes of travel. At state DOTs, travel 
volumes, pavement conditions, bridge conditions, and other data are typically collected 
manually (14). Transit agencies monitor ridership through manual ride counts (and 
increasingly from electronic farecard data), validated by revenues (20). They may also 
monitor congestion and performance through automated vehicle location (AVL) systems. 
Other sources of transportation data useful for strategic managers include customer 
feedback and input from the general public, for example through public hearings and 
“town hall” meetings. 
There are many advantages to using new sources of data, generated by advanced 
technologies, to supplement or replace existing sources of data that support planning 
activities. For example, FHWA characterizes transportation data when collected by 
traditional means versus when collected using advanced technologies such as ITS (21). 
Whereas traditional survey data are collected infrequently, cover only small periods, and 
require intensive labor, ITS data are collected continuously and automatically. Tradeoffs 
include the higher cost of storage for ITS data and greater difficulty in checking errors. 
Table 2 presents several examples of types of data that can be supplemented and/or 
replaced with data from innovative, technology-enabled sources. 
 
TABLE 2  Examples of Innovative Data Sources for Strategy Development 
Type of 
data 
Traditional 
sources Innovative sources Advantages 
Vehicle 
volumes 
Sampled manual 
counts at specific 
points 
Complete, 
continuous counts 
across a network 
More complete coverage of 
road networks, spatially and 
temporally 
Transit 
ridership 
Sampled manual 
ride checks 
Automated 
passenger counters 
and farecard data 
More complete coverage of 
transit networks, spatially and 
temporally 
Travel 
demand 
Mode choice and 
origin-destination 
surveys 
Vehicle tracking 
via GPS and/or 
DSRC 
Continuous O-D vehicle flows 
across a network provide broad 
coverage 
Crash data Police crash 
reports 
Automated crash 
reporting systems 
More complete records; 
improved accuracy of crash 
location and other aspects  
 
As technologies for collecting information about the transportation system 
change, the types of data available inevitably change. These data can be incorporated into 
strategy development processes and can support strategic decision-making; however, 
doing so requires more than simply technology. In organizations with formalized strategy 
development processes such as planning, data are collected and used almost 
ritualistically. Surveys, traffic counts, census data, and other sources are utilized to 
support a routine analytical process. In such a system, advances in technology may or not 
be useful. For example, if the technology offers an improvement to the quality of data 
already being used or a new source of data that fits easily within the framework of the 
existing analytical process, then the technology is likely to be utilized, as illustrated by 
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FHWA’s summary of several archived data management systems (ADMS) for ITS-
collected data (21). However, new types of data not currently used in the strategy 
development process will not necessarily be useful without first changing the process 
itself. Conversely, if strategists are interested in making improvements to the strategy 
development processes of their organizations, then technological advances can serve as 
key enablers. 
 
Temporal Scales of Decision-Making 
In transportation, as in most businesses, strategies tend to be long-term in nature. But 
exactly how long is long term? The time frame over which strategic are intended to 
perform varies widely. The selection of an explicit time frame, if taken, shapes the 
strategy development process. Meanwhile, technology can serve to expand the feasible 
range of time frames. 
Early metropolitan transportation plans in the U.S. employed planning horizons 
ranging from approximately 20 to 40 years. According to Boyce et al., the reason for 
these time horizons was that planners modeled their projections of demographic trends 
and travel demand together with fully-elaborated alternative visions of future 
metropolitan-scale transportation networks, including highways and transit (22). The 
alternative future networks would take decades to build. Consequently, in order to 
observe any meaningful differentiation among the modeled performance of alternative 
future networks, planners had to build and test transportation scenarios at a future time by 
which the networks could be reasonably expected to be fully built. Today, per federal 
regulations, state and MPO long-range transportation plans must employ a minimum 20-
year strategic planning horizon (9). Likewise, transit operators must perform financial 
planning over a 20-year horizon. Given the long lead times in construction of new 
physical infrastructure, these time frames fit the original justification. 
However, strategic does not necessarily mean “long term” and certainly does not 
necessarily mean “20 years.” Many in the transportation industry have observed the 
increasing importance of operations, particularly in those areas where infrastructure 
expansion is limited. Application of advanced technologies (e.g., ITS) and operational 
techniques are viewed as alternatives to the traditional approach of expanding physical 
infrastructure to provide capacity. Sussman notes that in this environment, transportation 
planning should no longer be limited strictly to infrastructure; “planning for operations” 
is an increasingly important parallel activity (23). However, he suggests that the time 
scales of planning for infrastructure (long-term) and planning for operations planning 
(shorter-term) differ. Actual operations, meanwhile, require a real-time perspective. 
In short, the formal, established strategy development processes of U.S. 
transportation organizations, such as planning, are based on transportation infrastructure 
technologies with long construction times that required decades-long perspectives. 
Moreover, the analytical aspects of planning required large amounts of data, long lead 
times for data collection, and long lead times for analysis. As a result, strategy 
development through the planning process not only looks to a distant horizon, but it also 
takes a considerable amount of time to complete the necessary analysis to support the 
development of the strategy. 
Today, advanced technologies allow for consideration of new time frames as data 
are collected, assembled, and analyzed more rapidly than in the past. Moreover, although 
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investments in the preservation and expansion of physical infrastructure will still be 
necessary, the growing emphasis on operations requires more responsive transportation 
strategies, developed more frequently and with shorter life cycles. 
 
Spatial Scales of Decision-Making 
Transportation organizations and regions develop strategies that apply to particular 
spatial scales. In this section we first draw an analogy between the spatial scale of 
transportation organizations and the size of private sector companies involved in strategy 
development. Next, we consider both the experiences of organizations and observations 
in prior literature on the spatial scale of strategy development for surface transportation. 
In business, the size and scope of an organization are major factors affecting its 
strategy development processes. What roles do central management and the various 
business units play in developing strategy? Is strategy developed centrally and 
communicated down the hierarchy to business units, or do pieces of strategy emerge 
within business units and travel up the hierarchy to central management? If a company 
participates in multiple industrial sectors, rather than a single sector, how does 
management develop a unified strategy for those diverse components? Does it even try? 
These are the sorts of questions explored by corporate strategists. Andrews (1980), for 
example, argues for strong management and strong participation by a board of directors 
to craft a unifying corporate strategy that guides the diverse segments of the diversified 
corporation. Mintzberg, on the other hand, argues for management to play a more passive 
role of recognizing patterns inside the organization before promoting or implementing 
major changes of direction, or strategy “revolutions” (24). 
This is analogous to transportation strategy development, which, in practice, 
occurs at a variety of spatial scales in the U.S. In the early 20th century, the federal 
government undertook an effort to define highway corridors at a national scale, with 
substantial input from states; these corridors ultimately became the Interstate highway 
system. Contemporary strategy development occurs largely within states and 
metropolitan areas, while operating agencies such as turnpike authorities and transit 
agencies also develop strategy for geographies coincident with their operating boundaries 
(10). 
Statewide strategy development occurs through the transportation planning 
process at state DOTs. The “state” as a preferred spatial unit for transportation strategy 
development in the U.S. is a product of both political and financial history. During the 
early decades of the national highway planning efforts, for example, the states 
contributed the majority of the decision making to the federal government with regard to 
determining highway locations, routes, and order of construction. Also, for most of the 
20th century, states collected fuel taxes to fund transportation investments (17). As 
owners of fuel tax revenue streams, the states required a process by which to determine 
how to disburse revenues back to the transportation system. These factors can be 
understood as the historical influences that have led to the role of today’s statewide 
organizations (state DOTs) as strong actors in the determination of transportation 
investments. 
Despite the financial and political dominance of state DOTs, metropolitan 
strategy development has grown in importance in the latter part of the 20th century. The 
origins of today’s metropolitan planning efforts date to the technical studies of 
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transportation demand in urban areas of the late 1950s, such as the Chicago and Detroit 
Metropolitan Area Transportation Studies. Just as a decades-long time scale was needed 
for technical analysis, the metropolitan scale was appropriate for the application of large-
scale alternative future visions of a regional highway network and of the mathematical 
models that had been developed to estimate travel demand on urban highways. In 
addition to the analytical convenience of the metropolitan scale, planners appear to have 
been motivated by a belief that the metropolitan area was an important economic unit 
with dense, strong internal connectivity. Just as Porter would later recognize, the authors 
of the Chicago and Detroit studies argued that metropolitan regions “are, and will 
continually be, in competition with one another.” Moreover: 
 
The productive strength of a metropolitan area is affected by the design and 
operation of its internal transport system. Once again there is great need to secure 
a more efficient transport system, and there will be great rewards for those areas 
which do so most effectively. (25) 
 
According to Meyer and Miller, the Chicago and Detroit studies, and their 
successors in the 1950s and 1960s “facilitated ‘rational’ decision making by developing 
comprehensive plans… 20 to 25 years into the future” (11, 25). Comprehensive, in this 
context, refers to the metropolitan spatial scale. Boyce et al. (22) observed that the 
metropolitan land use and transportation planning programs of the 1960s “evolved from 
the urban transportation study of the late 1950 to early 1960 period.” The 1960s 
metropolitan planning programs were later codified by federal laws as the metropolitan 
planning process and carried out by MPOs (10). Recent research by Porter and others in 
the regional science field reflect the motivations explicitly stated in the Chicago study 
and highlight the economic importance of “regions” as units of competition (e.g., 26). 
The scale suggested by Porter is not necessarily limited to the conventional metropolitan 
area; he suggests a broader regional perspective such as a sub-national region or even a 
nation.  
Despite the emergence of the metropolitan scale, there is little direct evidence to 
support a causal link between the importance of metropolitan areas or larger regions as 
economic actors and the explicit need for metropolitan or regional transportation strategy 
development processes. In addition, there is no explicit attempt in the literature to justify 
the metropolitan scale of strategy development over any other geographic scale – smaller 
or larger. Meanwhile, technological advances have allowed for new consideration of new 
spatial scales for strategy development. Sussman et al., for example, suggest that 
deployment of ITS requires a regionally-scaled perspective for strategic transportation 
planning (27). However, they caution that the institutional issues inherent in pursuing 
strategic planning at a regional scale require careful analysis and propose the Complex, 
Large-scale, Interconnected, Open Socio-technical (CLIOS) process as a means of 
analyzing – in an integrated fashion – the institutional, cultural, and technological hurdles 
to regional strategy development. This regional perspective for planning follows 
regionally-scaled operations, as reflected in the development of Regional ITS 
Architectures. According to Rodriguez, et al., “a system architecture, while guiding the 
deployment of ITS, is further proposed as the instrument to address the regional 
transportation planning and coordination needs implied by the competitive region” (28). 
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Amekudzi et al. suggest an even broader, “supra-regional” scale for transportation 
planning (29). Their motivation for recommending this scale is not technological, but 
demographic: “as several metropolitan areas achieve megacity status and in some cases 
morph into megalopolises, the planning period and area may effectively have to expand 
accordingly.” 
There is no consensus in the literature or in practice as to the “appropriate” spatial 
scale for strategy development in surface transportation. Metropolitan-, regional-, supra-
regional-, statewide-, national-, and organizationally-focused scales have all been 
proposed and practiced, with no clear preference emerging. It is clear that technology, 
analytical methods, demographics, economics, politics, and even culture are factors 
affecting the spatial scale of strategy development, with the relative weights of these 
factors varying by location. Moreover, as the spatial scale of strategy development for 
transportation expands, so do the related issues or sectors that must be considered in the 
strategy development process. Like the diversified corporation that must determine a 
unifying strategy for multiple business units and products, a strategy development 
process for transportation that covers a large geography must increasingly consider not 
only transportation but also other issues that become important at larger scales, including 
economic development, distributional equity, the environment, and energy. 
 
ALTERNATIVES TO PLANNING 
The planning approach to strategy development is well documented in management 
literature and widely practiced both in the private sector and among transportation 
organizations. Among U.S. transportation organizations, technology has played a major 
role in determining the various elements of the planning process, such as revenue 
sources, information sources, temporal scales, and spatial scales. However, other 
approaches to strategy development such as through learning and consensus building are 
worth considering, particularly as they are enabled by further advances in technology. 
Mintzberg et al. characterize the “learning” approach to strategy development as a 
largely emergent one. Numerous actors within an organization make strategic decisions, 
from which a strategy emerges. Strategists can exercise control in this model by 
recognizing the emergent patterns of the many distributed decisions and responding 
appropriately. In surface transportation, it is conceivable that strategists could take 
advantage of detailed traveler and revenue data, made available by advanced 
technologies, in order to better see the patterns emergent in the collective decisions of 
users and respond to them, rather than by proposing (and perhaps imposing) a vision of 
the future, however rationally determined, on the users. 
Another potential approach to strategy development is strategy development 
through consensus. Although consensus building among stakeholder groups is a feature 
of existing planning processes, planning cannot account for the viewpoints of the entire 
population of interest. With advanced, highly-distributed technologies, it is possible to 
reach a much broader portion of stakeholders, whether directly through an interactive 
process such as virtual “town hall” meetings or indirectly through real-time measurement 
of users’ traveler behavior over time. 
Regardless of the particular approach taken, it is increasingly clear that with 
advanced technologies, it is possible to conceive of, at minimum, improvements to 
existing planning process by incorporating data made available by advanced 
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technologies. It is conceivable even to shift to entirely new approaches to strategy 
development that do not involve “planning,” at least not as planning is currently 
understood and practiced by organizations in the U.S. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Surface transportation organizations in the U.S. usually develop strategy through a formal 
planning process. Key elements of strategy development for surface transportation 
include revenue sources, information sources, temporal scales, and spatial scales. To a 
large extent, technology determines the options available for each of these elements. 
• Options for collecting revenues from surface transportation systems have 
expanded with the growth of ETC and farecard technology. The selection of 
revenue sources is ultimately a function of political and institutional context; 
however, once selected, revenue sources play an important role as a feature in the 
strategy development process. 
• The range and quality of available system data has grown with the deployment of 
transportation technologies. Again, political and institutional context influence 
how data are used in the strategy development process, but technology-enabled 
sources of data offer the potential for reshaping strategy development processes. 
• Deliberate strategies may be developed to cover specific temporal scales (e.g., 10 
years, 20 years). The selection of a particular time scale is influenced by the 
quality and speed of information collected to support the planning process, the 
amount of time required to perform analyses, and the degree to which operations 
in the transportation system are emphasized. 
• Strategies in transportation inherently span a region of some spatial extent and 
organization(s) with responsibilities at that scale, which then shapes the strategy 
development process. Once again, the size and scope of the organization(s) or 
region are determined ultimately by politics and institutional contexts, but can 
also respond as technology increases the range of available, feasible spatial scales. 
 
Today, the power to develop strategy in the U.S. rests largely in the hands of 
transportation organizations, rather than elected leaders. It is important that those 
organizations exercise that power effectively. A sure way to improve the strategy 
development process of an organization is to recognize explicitly, first, that one is in fact 
engaged in strategy development. Strategists in surface transportation, such as managers 
of transportation organizations and planning agencies, can use this discussion to improve 
their ability to recognize the explicit strategy development processes they are following 
and the elements that compose that process. They can also begin to explore ways in 
which to use advanced technology, beyond operations, to pursue innovative strategy 
development processes, whether those innovations are incremental improvements to the 
existing process of planning or a more fundamental shift away from planning and toward 
a new paradigm such as strategy development through learning or consensus building. 
Future research will advance the notion of adopting alternative approaches to 
strategy development such as learning and consensus building in surface transportation. 
To support this research, new frameworks describing innovative strategy development 
processes and their institutional contexts will be required, which will explain in detail 
how strategy can be developed through approaches other than planning, what roles 
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technology will play, and how we can migrate from the current framework to these 
possible future frameworks. In addition, it will be necessary to test the feasibility of these 
alternative frameworks for strategy development, both by examining their political 
feasibility and by testing whether these new approaches to strategy development can, in 
fact, improve strategies and strategic decisions to the extent that we can observe 
measurable improvements in the performance of transportation systems.
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